2V0-13.24 Dumps with Practice Exam Questions Answers

The VCF 5.2 design must ensure the business application (two VMs) remains available during business hours (9 AM - 5 PM weekdays) and is protected from storage I/O disruptions in a consolidated architecture with a single six-host cluster using vSAN. The goal is to mitigate risks to the application’s performance and availability. Let’s evaluate each option:

Option A: Use resource pools to apply CPU and memory reservations on the business application virtual machinesResource pools with reservations ensure CPU and memory availability, which could help performance. However, the application’s sensitivity is tostorage I/O, not CPU/memory, and the availability requirement (business hours) isn’t directly addressed by reservations. While useful, this doesn’t fully mitigate the primary risks identified, making it less optimal.

Option B: Implement FTT=6 for the business application virtual machinesThis is incorrect and infeasible. In vSAN, Failures to Tolerate (FTT) defines the number of host or disk failures a storage object can withstand, with a maximum FTT dependent on cluster size. FTT=6 requires at least 13 hosts (2n+1 where n=6), but the cluster has only six hosts, supporting a maximum FTT=2 (RAID-5/6). Even if feasible, FTT addresses data redundancy, not runtime availability or I/O sensitivity during business hours, making this irrelevant to the stated risks.

Option C: Perform ESXi host maintenance activities outside of the stated business hoursThis is the correct answer. In a vSAN-based VCF cluster, ESXi host maintenance (e.g., patching, reboots) triggers data resyncs and VM migrations (via vMotion), which can impact storage I/O performance and potentially cause brief disruptions. The application’s sensitivity to storage I/O and its availability requirement (9 AM - 5 PM weekdays) mean maintenance during business hours poses a risk. Scheduling maintenance outside these hours (e.g., nights or weekends) mitigates this by ensuring uninterrupted I/O performance and availability during critical times, directly addressing the customer’s needs.

Option D: Replace the vSAN shared storage exclusively with an All-Flash Fibre Channel shared storage solutionThis is incorrect. While an All-Flash Fibre Channel array might offer better I/O performance, VCF’s consolidated architecture relies on vSAN as the primary storage for management and workload domains. Replacing vSAN entirely contradicts the chosen architecture and introduces unnecessarycomplexity and cost. The sensitivity to storage I/O changes doesn’t justify abandoning vSAN, especially since All-Flash vSAN could meet performance needs if properly tuned.

Option E: Use Anti-Affinity Distributed Resource Scheduler (DRS) rules on the business application virtual machinesAnti-Affinity DRS rules ensure the two VMs run on separate hosts, improving availability by avoiding a single host failure impacting both. While this mitigates some risk, it doesn’t address storage I/O sensitivity (a vSAN-wide concern) or guarantee availability during business hours if maintenance occurs. It’s a partial solution but less effective than scheduling maintenance outside business hours.

Conclusion:The best design decision is toperform ESXi host maintenance activities outside of the stated business hours(Option C). This directly mitigates the risk of storage I/O disruptions and ensures availability during 9 AM - 5 PM weekdays, aligning with the customer’s requirements in the VCF 5.2 consolidated architecture.

References:

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Architecture and Deployment Guide (Section: Consolidated Architecture Design)

VMware vSAN 7.0U3 Planning and Deployment Guide (integrated in VCF 5.2): Maintenance Mode Considerations

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Planning and Preparation Guide (Section: Availability and Performance Design)

In VMware Cloud Foundation (VCF) 5.2, design documentation categorizes information into requirements, assumptions, constraints, risks, and decisions to guide the solution’s implementation. The need for workloads in VI Workload Domains to connect to an existing Fibre Channel (FC) storage array has specific implications. Let’s analyze how this should be classified:

Option A: As an assumptionAn assumption is a statement taken as true without proof, typically used when information is uncertain or unverified. The scenario states that the architectdiscoveredthis need during workshops with stakeholders, implying it’s a confirmed fact, not a guess. Documenting it as an assumption (e.g., “We assume workloads need FC storage”) would understate its certainty and misrepresent its role in the design process. This option is incorrect.

Option B: As a constraintThis is the correct answer. Aconstraintis a limitation or restriction that influences the design, often imposed by existing infrastructure, policies, or resources. The requirement to use an existing FC storage array limits the storage options for the VI Workload Domains, as VCF natively uses vSAN as the principal storage for workload domains. Integrating FC storage introduces additional complexity (e.g., FC zoning, HBA configuration) and restricts the design from relying solely on vSAN. In VCF 5.2, external storage like FC is supported via supplemental storage for VI Workload Domains, but it’s a deviation from the default architecture, making it a constraint imposed by the environment. Documenting it as such ensures it’s accounted for in planning and implementation.

Option C: As a design decisionA design decision is a deliberate choice made by the architect to meet requirements (e.g., “We will use FC storage over iSCSI”). Here, the need for FC storage is a stakeholder-provided fact, not a choice the architect made. The decision tosupportFC storage might follow, but the initial discovery is a pre-existing condition, not the decision itself. Classifying it as a design decision skips the step of recognizing it as a design input, making this option incorrect.

Option D: As a business requirementA business requirement defineswhatthe organization needs to achieve (e.g., “Workloads must support 99.9% uptime”). While the FC storage need relates to workloads, it’s a technical specification abouthowconnectivity is achieved, not a high-level business goal. Business requirements typically originate from organizational objectives, not infrastructure details discovered in workshops. This option is too broad and misaligned with the technical nature of the information, making it incorrect.

Conclusion:The need to connect workloads to an existing FC storage array is aconstraint(Option B) because it limits the storage design options for the VI Workload Domains and reflects an existing environmental factor. In VCF 5.2, this would influence the architect to plan for Fibre Channel HBAs, external storage configuration, and compatibility with vSphere, documenting it as a constraint ensures these considerations are addressed.

References:

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Architecture and Deployment Guide (Section: VI Workload Domain Storage Options)

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Planning and Preparation Guide (Section: Design Constraints and Assumptions)

vSphere 7.0U3 Storage Guide (integrated in VCF 5.2): External Storage Integration

The scenario involves designing a VMware Cloud Foundation (VCF) stretched cluster with L2 non-uniform connectivity, leveraging NSX (a core component of VCF) for networking. The customer’s past incident, where an attacker injected false routes into their dynamic global routing table, indicates a security vulnerability in the routing protocol. The Tier-0 gateway in NSX handles external connectivity and routing, typically using dynamic routing protocols like BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) or OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) to exchange routes with external routers. The design decision must prevent unauthorized route injection, ensuring the integrity of the routing table.

Context Analysis:

Stretched Cluster with L2 Non-Uniform Connectivity:In VCF 5.2, a stretched cluster spans multiple availability zones (AZs) with L2 connectivity for workload VMs, but the Tier-0 gateway uplinks may use L3 routing to external networks. “Non-uniform” suggests varying latency or bandwidth between sites, but this does not directly impact the routing security concern.

False Routes Injection:This implies the attacker exploited a lack of authentication or filtering in the routing protocol, allowing unauthorized route advertisements to be accepted into the Tier-0 gateway’s routing table.

Tier-0 Gateway:In NSX, the Tier-0 gateway is the edge component that peers with external routers (e.g., top-of-rack switches or upstream routers) and supports dynamic routing protocols like BGP and OSPF.

Routing Security in NSX:

NSX Tier-0 gateways commonly use BGP for external connectivity due to its scalability and flexibility in multi-site deployments like stretched clusters. OSPF is also supported but is less common for external peering in VCF designs.

Route injection attacks occur when an unauthorized device advertises routes without validation, often due to missing authentication mechanisms.

Option Analysis:

A. OSPF MD5 authentication:OSPF supports MD5 authentication to secure routing updates between neighbors. Each OSPF message is hashed with a shared secret key, ensuring only trusted peers can exchange routes. This would prevent false route injection if OSPF were the protocol in use. However, in VCF stretched cluster designs, BGP is the default and recommended protocol for Tier-0 gateway uplinks to external networks, as per the VMware Cloud Foundation Design Guide. OSPF is typically used for internal NSX routing (e.g., between Tier-0 and Tier-1 gateways) rather than external peering. Without evidence that OSPF is used here, and given BGP’s prevalence in such scenarios, this option is less applicable.

B. Gateway Firewall with ECMP:The Gateway Firewall on the Tier-0 gateway filters traffic, not routes. Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) enhances bandwidth by load-balancing across multiple uplinks but does not inherently secure the routing table. While a firewall could block traffic from malicious sources, it cannot prevent the Tier-0 gateway from accepting false route advertisements in the control plane (routing protocol). Route injection occurs at the routing protocol level, not the data plane, so this option does not address theroot issue. The NSX Administration Guide confirms that firewall rules apply to packet forwarding, not route validation, making this incorrect.

C. Implicit deny for any traffic:An implicit deny rule in the Gateway Firewall blocks all traffic not explicitly allowed, enhancing security for data plane traffic. However, this does not protect the control plane—specifically, the dynamic routing protocol—from accepting false routes. Route injection happens before traffic filtering, as the routing table determines where packets are sent. The VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 documentation emphasizes that routing security requires protocol-specific measures, not just firewall rules. This option fails to prevent the described attack and is incorrect.

D. BGP peer password:BGP supports authentication via a peer password (MD5-based in NSX), where each BGP session between the Tier-0 gateway and its external peers (e.g., physical routers) uses a shared secret. This ensures that only authenticated peers can advertise routes, preventing unauthorized devices from injecting false routes into the dynamic routing table. In VCF 5.2 stretched cluster deployments, BGP is the standard protocol for Tier-0 uplinks, as it supports multi-site connectivity and ECMP for redundancy. The NSX-T Data Center Design Guide and VCF documentation recommend BGP authentication to secure routing in such environments, directly addressing the customer’s past incident. This is the most relevant and effective design decision.

Conclusion:The architect should chooseBGP peer password (D)as the design decision for the Tier-0 gateway. This secures the BGP routing protocol—widely used in VCF stretched clusters—against false route injection by requiring authentication, aligning with the scenario’s security requirements and NSX best practices.

References:

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Design Guide (Section: NSX Design for Stretched Clusters)

VMware NSX-T Data Center 3.2 Administration Guide (Section: Tier-0 Gateway Routing)

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Planning and Preparation Workbook (Section: Networking Security)

VMware Validated Design for Stretched Clusters (Section: Routing Security)

In VMware Cloud Foundation (VCF) 5.2, the logical design outlines high-level architectural decisions that define the system’s structure and behavior, distinct from physical or operational details, as per theVCF 5.2 Design Guide. Networking decisions in the logical design focus on connectivity frameworks, security policies, and scalability. Let’s evaluate each:

Option A: DD04 - Deploy 2x 64-port Cisco Nexus 9300 switches for top-of-rack ESXi host connectivityThis specifies physical hardware (switch model, port count), which belongs in the physical design (e.g., BOM, rack layout). TheVCF 5.2 Architectural Guideclassifies hardware selections as physical, not logical, unless they dictate architecture, which isn’t the case here.

Option B: DD01 - Set NSX Distributed Firewall (DFW) to block all traffic by defaultThis is a specific security policy within NSX DFW, defining traffic behavior. While critical, it’s an implementation detail (e.g., rule configuration), not a high-level logical design decision. TheVCF 5.2 Networking Guideplaces DFW rules in detailed design, not the logical overview.

Option C: DD03 - Connect the management interface eth0 of each NSX Edge node to VLAN 100This details a specific interface-to-VLAN mapping, an operational or physical configuration. TheVCF 5.2 Networking Guidetreats such specifics as implementation-level decisions, not logical design elements.

Option D: DD02 - Use VLANs to separate physical network functionsUsing VLANs to segment network functions (e.g., management, vMotion, vSAN) is a foundational networking architecture decision in VCF. It defines the logical separation of traffic types, enhancing security and scalability. TheVCF 5.2 Architectural Guideincludes VLAN segmentation as a core logical design component, aligning with standard VCF networking practices.

Conclusion:Option D (DD02) is included in the logical design, as it defines the architectural approach to network segmentation, a key logical networking decision in VCF 5.2.References:

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Architectural Guide(docs.vmware.com): Logical Design and Network Segmentation.

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Networking Guide(docs.vmware.com): VLAN Usage in VCF.

VMware Cloud Foundation 5.2 Design Guide(docs.vmware.com): Logical vs. Physical Design.